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Abstract
Campaign expenditures are not effective in increasing candidates’ vote shares if voters do not
respond to the advertisement when they believe that campaign expenditures are financed with
“tainted money.” In this situation, limiting contributions may reduce the number of policy
favors that candidates promise to contributors, and thereby increase the effectiveness of
campaign spending. Exploiting cross-state variation in campaign finance laws, this paper tests
whether campaign expenditures by state House candidates are more productive in increasing
vote shares when candidates run in states that limit contributions. The results show that
campaign expenditures by incumbents, challengers, and open seat candidates are more
productive when candidates run in states with campaign contribution limits, as opposed to in
states without limits. Controlling for the endogeneity of incumbent spending, the study shows
that in states with contribution limits, incumbent spending and challenger spending are
equally productive, and that spending by both candidates is quantitatively important in
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assistance.1The other central issue is whether limits on contributions curtail free speech.
2For example, in 2000 in Nixon v. Shrink the U.S. Supreme Court agreed with a district
court that “large contributions raise suspicions of influence peddling tending to undermine
citizens’ confidence "in the integrity of … government"” and that contribution limits are one way
of upholding citizens’ confidence.  This ruling was based on the 1976 Buckley v. Valeo decision
which upheld contribution limits with the expressed hope that this would uphold or improve
citizens trust in the integrity of government.
1
I. Introduction
At the center of the campaign finance reform debate is the concern that campaign
contributions from private interests give rise to corruption and the appearance of corruption.
1 
This concern has motivated the U.S. Supreme Court to uphold contribution limits at the federal
and state level.  If contribution limits reduce the influence of contributors over policies or the
perception of corruption, then contribution limits may change voters’ perception of the integrity
of the political process – an explicit “hope” expressed by the courts upholding contribution
limits.
2   To date, there is scant evidence on whether contribution limits result in outcomes that
are consistent with the hypothesis that contribution limits reduce voters’ perceptions of
corruption.  This paper attempts to fill this void.  
One of the central and somewhat puzzling findings in the academic literature on the
effects of campaign advertisements on vote shares is that campaign expenditures have either no
effect on the vote shares of challengers and incumbents (Levitt 1994, Palda and Palda 1998), or
that challenger expenditures, and sometimes incumbent expenditures,  have only a small effect
on vote shares (Jacobson 1978, Green and Krasno 1988, Grier 1989, Coates 1998, Gerber 1998). 
(I will use the terms campaign contributions and campaign expenditures interchangeably,
assuming that all contributions are spent.)  The result that campaign expenditures are not very3http://www.cfinst.org/studies/vital/commentary.html
4A separate empirical literature that examines whether contributions influence legislators
decisions, correlates contributions with legislators’ voting behavior or time allocation (Chappel
1981, Kau et al. 1982,  Hall and Wayman 1990, Durden et al. 1991, Evans 1986, Snyder 1992,
Bronars and Lott 1997, Stratmann 1991, 1995, 2002, Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder
2003).  This second strand of literature has produced mixed results.  To date there is no
consensus to the extent that contributions result in quid-pro-quos, and thus changes in legislator
behavior.
2
effective in increasing candidates’ vote shares is puzzling, given the apparent importance of
spending large sums of money in electoral races.  For example, in the 2000 elections candidates
for the U.S. House of Representatives in competitive races spent between $2 million and $2.5
million and the average winner in Senate races spent $7.4 million.
3
Recent theoretical models show that the productivity of campaign spending may be low
when politicians trade policy favors for campaign contributions, because voters do not respond to
campaign messages when they believe that the messages are financed with “tainted” money
(Ashworth 2003, Coate 2003, Prat 2002a).   Thus, small marginal effects of spending may have
been found because voters do not respond to the advertisement when they believe that candidates
trade policy favors for contributions.
4  In this situation, contribution limits that lead to a reduction
in  policy favors make a candidate’s campaign advertisement more productive because voters
attach more credence advertisements financed with “clean” money.
Previous empirical work may have found a low effectiveness of campaign spending
because it did not account for the possibility that voters are less likely to vote for candidates who
they believe to have promised policy favors to their contributors.  This paper allows for the
effectiveness of campaign spending to differ, depending on whether campaign spending is
financed with “tainted” as opposed to “clean” money.  Thereby it helps to solve the long-standing3
puzzle regarding the effectiveness of campaign expenditures for incumbents’ and challengers’
vote shares. 
To test the hypothesis that the effectiveness of contributions depends on whether
campaign contributions are limited, federal U.S. data are not useful, as contribution limits to
federal candidates are uniform for all candidates and have remain unchanged in nominal terms
from 1976 until the recent federal 2002 legislation.  This, however, is not the case with state
campaign finance laws, which vary across states.  State-level regulations provide the variation
that allows one the hypothesis that campaign expenditures’ effectiveness depends on whether
contributions are limited or not. This study therefore analyses the vote shares of candidates for
state lower House races in states with and without contribution limits.
Any work on campaign expenditures has to address the issue that campaign expenditures
are endogenous in the vote share equation because variables, such as unobserved district
partisanship or unobserved candidate quality are determining both the level of campaign
advertisements and the votes shares candidates receive.  Much of the literature on this issue has
focused on the likelihood that incumbent campaign expenditures are endogenous while
challenger expenditures are taken as exogenous.  This study takes the same approach, but
introduces a new instrument that identifies the effect of incumbent spending on his or her vote
share.  This instrument is the cost of advertising in the House district in which the incumbent
runs for reelection.  Advertising cost for media, such as television and radio advertisements
determine campaign expenses, and if advertising cost are uncorrelated with district partisanship
or incumbent quality, advertising cost is a valid instrument for campaign expenditures.
The results in this paper indicate that the marginal product of advertising expenditures is4
higher for all candidates when they run in states with campaign finance limits.  This is the case
for candidates in open seat races as well as for incumbents and challengers.  The findings suggest
that voter’s discount campaign advertising when they anticipate that candidates promised favors
to interest groups in exchange for campaign contributions, and thus are consistent with the
hypothesis that contribution limits reduce the perception of corruption.
In summary, this paper provides three contributions to the literature on the role of money
in elections.  It examines whether the results on the productivity of spending are consistent with
the hypothesis that voters are less easily swayed by a campaign message when they believe that
the candidate promised favors to interest groups in order to raise contributions. Further, it
develops a new instrument for campaign spending which provides estimates for the productivity
of incumbent spending, and using this instrument, the results show that in states with limits, the
marginal product of spending is equated across incumbents and challengers.  Finally, it examines
this issue using state level data, which allow for a test of the proposed hypotheses using cross-
state variation in campaign finance regimes. 
Section II contains the theoretical framework that will guide the empirical analysis.  The
empirical research design is described in section III, and the data in section IV.  I report results in
section V, and section VI contains conclusions.
II.  Conceptual Framework
A number of theoretical models predict that campaign contribution limits influence
electoral outcomes.  The results in these models depend on assumptions regarding the objective
of candidates, the rationality of voters, the type of electoral competition, the goal of contributors,5This prediction that voters believe that politicians implement favors to contributors is
consistent with less formal work by law scholars, who claim that campaign contributions have a
corrupting influence on the political process (Lowenstein 1998).  This corrupting influence in
turn is thought to have a negative influence on voters perception of politics, and is thought to
have a negative influence on their participation in the political process.  Thus, even though
legislators are not necessarily for sale, voters will perceive that legislators have a conflict of
interest when they receive money from special interest groups (Lowenstein 1989). 
6Some empirical work finds that challenger spending sometimes reduces voters accuracy
in correctly placing an incumbent on an ideological scale (Coleman and Manna 2000)
5
and the role of advertising in inducing voters to change their voting behavior.  This section
describes the main features of models (Pratt 2002a, Coate 2003, Ashford 2003) that predict that
voters are less responsive to the campaign message, when they believe that candidates have
obtained campaign funds by promising policy favors to contributors.
5
A common strand in formal campaign advertising models is that candidates’
advertisements convey information to voters or that advertising provides a signal about candidate
quality.  It is assumed that the candidates do not disseminate lies about their qualities, and this
assumption is probably a good first approximation, as if it were not, the opposing candidate
would readily point out the lacking truth, and thus no candidate would have an incentive to
disseminate lies.
6  Voters are assumed to have priors about candidates’ positions or qualities, and
campaign advertising allows voters to update their beliefs about candidate attributes.  Thus,
advertising provides a useful function in the political competition.  It informs voters about
candidate quality and about candidates’ characteristics.  
In many of these candidate advertisement models, interest groups contribute because they
expect policy favors from the candidate when elected, while candidates ideological position is
assumed to be fixed (Coate 2003) or interest groups contribute because they want to move a7If the voter would automatically vote for the candidate who does not advertise, no
candidate would advertise in equilibrium (Wittman 2002).  
6
candidate’s platform closer to their own position (Prat 2002). While the empirical support for the
assumption that interest groups and candidates engage in quid-pro-quos is mixed, this
assumption appears to be reasonable since contributors may have a stronger incentive to donate
money to obtain a private good - a policy favor - as opposed to a public good - wanting the
preferred candidate elected.  
Voters know that candidates who do not advertise, do not advertise because they have no
good information to disseminate about themselves, and thus are low quality candidates. 
However, if a voter sees a campaign message from candidate A and no campaign message from
candidate B, he does not automatically vote for candidate A, because he knows that candidate A
promised at least some favors to the interest group in exchange for obtaining campaign funds.
7 
Thus, promising favors to contributors has a cost to candidates because voters are less likely to
switch their vote to the advertising candidate because voters know that policy favors have been
promised.  Had fewer favors been sold, the campaign message would have been more
convincing, and the probability that the voter would switch his vote to the advertising candidate
would have been higher.  
Dollar limits on contributions can reduce the number of policy favors candidates promise
to interest groups. While campaign contribution limits result in less campaign spending and
reduce voters’ information about their voting options, limits also effect voters’ evaluation of
candidates’ campaign messages because limits may decrease the number of favors candidates
promise to contributors. Assuming that one candidate advertises and the other does not, the7
probability that a voter will switch his vote to the advertising candidate will increase with limits
if the beneficial effects of limits, i.e.  fewer policy favor promises, outweigh their negative
effects, i.e. the information loss (Coate 2003).
In light of the described theoretical model, the finding that campaign spending has little,
if any, effect on vote shares at the national level (Levitt 1994, Palda and Palda 1998), may reflect
that  "the informational benefit of spending is offset by the policy bias needed to raise
contributions" (Prat 2002a, p. 182). 
While the theory points to the possibility that campaign advertising may be more
productive when contributions are limited, the theory also shows that contribution limits may not
have this effect if candidates are not inclined to promise many favors for votes, or when the loss
of information about who is the “better” candidate, due to reduced advertisements, is sufficiently
large (Coate 2003).  Thus, the extent to which limits increase the productivity of campaign
spending depends on how likely it is that candidates promise favors to contributors.  If candidates
tend to promise favors to contributors, then the empirical work is predicted to show that
campaign expenditures are more effective when limits are in place.
III.  Research Design and Methods
Given that contribution limits do not vary across federal races, an analysis of expenditures
by federal candidates will not reveal whether contribution limits can make campaign
expenditures more effective.  Thus, this study examines the effectiveness of campaign
advertising using state level data.  Contribution limits differ among the states and this paper
studies expenditure by candidates for state lower houses.8
To analyze whether campaign contribution limits determine the effectiveness of campaign
expenditures with respect to electoral outcomes, I will use the state House single member district
as the unit of analysis.  The empirical model is
VSijt =$0 + $1 Ispendijt *Nolimitit + $2 Ispendijt*Limitit + $3 Cspendijt *Nolimitit + 
$4 Cspendijt*Limitit + $5 Limitit + $6 Partyijt + $7 PevVSijt  + (Xit + vt + ,ijt , (1)
where VSijt is the incumbent’s vote share in state i, and election year t and district j.  The
variables Ispend and Cspend are incumbent and challenger campaign expenditures. 
Limit is an indicator variable which equals one when the campaign finance law restricts
individual contributions to candidates running in state House elections and zero otherwise. 
Nolimit equals one if there are no restrictions on individual contributions and zero otherwise.  
Equation (1) differs from the campaign spending models in the earlier literature, because
it interacts campaign expenditures with an contribution limit indicator.  If incumbent spending is
productive, then $1 is positive, and if challenger spending is productive, $3 is negative.  The
theoretical model in section II  predicts that $2 is positive and larger than $1 and that $4 is
negative and larger in absolute value than $3.  
An alternative, but equivalent specification is to run the regression explaining incumbent
votes shares with the levels of incumbent and challenger spending, and to interact spending by
both candidates with the limit indicator (and no interactions with the nolimit indicator).  This
specification allows for the testing of whether there is a significant difference in the productivity
of spending in limit versus non-limit states.  The chosen specification (1) has the advantage of9
readily showing the productivity of spending by challengers and incumbents in limit and no-limit
states, and I will report whether $1 and $2 (as well as $3 and $4) are significantly different from
each other.
To be consistent with the previous literature on the effects of expenditures on vote shares,
I include the variable PevVSijt which measures the historical electoral strength of the incumbent
(the so-called normal vote).  This variable serves as a measure of a district’s partisanship.  I also
include the Partyijt variable, which indicates the incumbent’s party affiliation (Jabcobson 1978,
Green and Krasno  1988).  I control for changes in national laws and national events that effect
local elections via year fixed effects vt.  
To control the for possibility that states with limits have a different political culture than
those without limits, we include an indicator variable which measures whether a state has a limit
on individual campaign contributions. Since this study is examining vote shares at the state level,
the vector Xit includes state characteristics, which previous studies have found to be of
importance in explaining vote shares in state elections. The vector includes state per capita
income, because voters tend to reward incumbents when they believe that they have helped them
financially (Lowry, Alt and Ferree 1999).  The vector of controls includes legislators’ salary,
which is a measure of the professionalism of the legislature (for example Fiorina 1994, Moncrief
1999, Berry et al. 2000).   In more professional legislatures incumbents have more resources to
help them get reelected.  The vector of state controls also includes an indicator for those states
that implemented term limits for state House legislators, since term limits reduce the duration an
individual can be a legislator, making public office less valuable (Grofman 1996).  Another
reason for including term limits is that the same political culture that led to the adoption of term10
limits may have also led to the adoption of contribution limits.  Thus, controlling for term limits
is an additional control for variables that may simultaneously determine campaign contributions
and election outcomes.  Another control variable is an indicator variable measuring whether the
state has an open primary election or not.  I also include in the regression equation  the share of
the state popular vote received by the gubernatorial candidate and the presidential candidate who
has the same party affiliation as the incumbent (or, in an alternative specification, the same party
affiliation as the open seat candidate whose vote share is explained by the regression).  These
variables capture the political leanings of the constituency and also capture political tides (Berry
et al. 2000).  Previous studies have also included measures for redistricting but this is not
required here as no redistricting occurred between the elections (1996, 1998, and 2000) analyzed
in this paper.
To control for the possibility that the effect of contributions is declining at the margin, I
will employ the log of campaign spending as well as the square root of spending in addition to
the linear functional form. 
Suppose that the production function for vote shares has diminishing marginal returns
(Mueller 1989), that states with contribution limits have lower levels of campaign spending than
those without limits, and that the production function is the same across states.  In this case, the
regression analysis would detect different levels of campaign spending productivity because the
marginal product of spending is higher in low campaign spending states with contribution limit
than in high campaign spending states with no contribution limits, and not because voters are
more responsive to the campaign message in states with contribution limits.
One way of addressing this issue is to use the log of spending.  This assures that the8Examining the ratio  of challenger spending to incumbent spending the difference in
limit an non-limit state is not statistically significant at the 5 percent level or less. 
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marginal product of the percent increases is the same, regardless of the level of spending.  This
specification recognizes that a candidate’s marginal product of advertising is the same if he or
she increases spending by ten percent starting from a base of $1,000, or by ten percent starting
from a base of $100,000.
Another way of addressing the aforementioned issue is to examine the relative spending
of incumbent and challengers.  Suppose for a given election cycle the production function for an
incumbent’s vote share is 
, (2)
were vsin is the incumbent’s i vote share in state n and Pn is an indicator equaling one if the state
n has contribution limits and zero otherwise and assume that both incumbent and challenger
spending are productive, thus  and  . When "I equals  "C and the 2s take
the assumed signs, then the first two terms of the production function collapse to ,
indicating that relative spending matters.  A similar result holds for the last two terms of the
production function.  Expression the equation in logs we get
. (3)
In this formulation, relative spending matters for vote shares. This amounts to a log
transformation of vote shares and contributions in equation (1).
8
The hypothesis that campaign expenditures are most effective when limits are in place is
easiest to test with expenditures in open seat races.  In those races no incumbency advantage9Many unobserved variables determine vote shares. For example, vote shares are
influenced by whether political parties recruit more challengers, by independent expenditures, by
party soft money, by leadership funds, and by incumbents’ war chests (Gierzynski and Breaux
1991, Epstein and Zemsky 1995, Milyo 1997, Milyo and Groseclose 1999, Hogan 2000, Gross,
Goidel and Shields 2002).  Unfortunately, much of this activity is not reported for candidates to
state lower houses.
12
exists, thus the omitted variable bias, due to a lack of data on candidate quality is less severe.  If
candidate quality is randomly distributed among Democrats and Republicans, the coefficients on
Republican and Democrat spending are not systematically biased.
For races with incumbents and challengers ordinary least square estimates from equation
(1) and equation (3) may be biased without good measures of district partisanship and of
incumbent and challenger quality.  Much of district partisanship as well as incumbent and
challenger quality are unobserved.  This omitted variable bias may lead to an underestimation the
effects of incumbent spending (see, for example, Jacobson 1978, Levitt 1994).
9 
The two-stage least square (2SLS) method provides unbiased estimates if the instruments
used are exogenous.  A valid instrument has to be correlated with the endogenous variable and
uncorrelated with the error term in the second stage.  Consistent with the previous literature, I
will allow for the endogeneity of incumbent spending while assuming that challenger spending is
exogenous.  
Our instrument is the cost of media advertisement.  Specifically, the instrument is the cost
of radio advertisement.  Candidates for state Houses use radio as one means of getting out their
campaign message.  The cost of this advertisement is one determinant of how much money
candidates have to raise in order go to get out their campaign message. Our measure of
advertising cost is the advertising cost per rating point.  This information was obtained from Spot13
Quotations and Data, Inc. (SQAD), who collects radio advertising cost data for each of the
Arbitron radio markets in the Untied States.  The advertising cost data is “cost per point,” which
is an estimate of the dollar amount required to deliver one rating point (or one percent of the
audience) of any designated population within a spot market area.   The radio advertising cost per
point is from the 3rd quarter and measures the costs for 60 second units, for population aged 18
and above.  In 2000, there were 267 Arbitron radio markets.  The Arbitron markets are generally
composed of metropolitan areas as defined by the federal government.  I mapped state House
congressional districts into these radio markets. The number of radio markets per state vary from
one in the state of Alaska to twenty-one in the state of California.  In 2000, the highest average
cost is New York with a cost of $578 per rating point, while the lowest is in Montana with an
average cost of $7.64 per rating point.  With respect to single markets, in the year 2000 the
highest cost of radio advertisement is in Los Angeles, California with $767 per rating point,
while the lowest cost markets are in Billings, Montana, and Bismarck, North Dakota, with $5 per
rating point. 
For advertising cost to be a valid instrument, the cost measure has to be correlated with
campaign expenditures.  Some anecdotal and some systematic evidence suggests that political
TV and advertising is a significant component of all campaign expenditures.  At the federal level,
for example, a headline the Washington Post claims that “In Presidential Race TV Ads were
biggest ‘96 Cost By Far” (March 31, 1997, page A19).  Systematic evidence is provides in 
Herrnson (2000) showing that TV and radio advertisements are a significant component of total
campaign spending.   Finally, PaineWebber analyst Leland Westerfield estimated that in 2000
TV broadcast advertisements reached $1 dollars and that radio, print and TV combined10http://www.bettercampaigns.org/freeairtime/monograph.pdf
11I know of no data measuring TV and radio advertising expenditures as a fraction of total
campaign expenditures for state Houses separately.
14
contribute to 80 percent of campaign expenses.
10  This estimate includes presidential, federal, and
state races.
11
The results section will show that this instrument is positively correlated with advertising
cost, thus meeting one requirement for a valid instrument.  The other requirement is met if cost
of radio advertisement is uncorrelated with candidate quality.  This requirement if fulfilled if low
quality incumbents do not tend to run for reelection in, for example, low advertising cost
districts. 
IV.  Data
Data on vote shares in general elections for state House single member districts in 1996,
1998 and 2000 come from each state’s Elections Division, or its State Board of Elections
(Stratmann and Aparicio-Castillo 2002).  I  focus on single member districts since over 80
percent of all state legislators are elected to these districts, and because the theoretical models
apply to these district types.  Since at the federal level all House districts are single member
districts, the focus on single member districts also makes it easier to transfer knowledge from the
state to the federal level. Campaign contribution data to candidates in the 1996, 1998 and 2000
elections to state lower Houses come from the National Institute on Money in State Politics.  
Data on state characteristics were obtained from various issues of the Statistical Abstract of the
United States.  Since no systematic data are available on campaign expenditure at the state level,12That campaign expenditures closely track campaign contributions is also suggested by
the statistic that only one percent of total campaign expenditures are self financed (Herrnson
2000).
13Only four states (Colorado, Missouri, Oregon, and Idaho) moved from unrestricted
contribution limits to contribution limits or vice versa between 1996 and 2000. 
14All categories of contribution limits tend to move together. That is, states that have strict
contribution limits for individuals also have strict limits for unions and corporations.
15
we measure campaign expenditures by campaign contributions.  Data at the federal level show
that campaign contributions closely track campaign expenditures
(http://www.fec.gov/press/canye98.htm).
12 
The source for the campaign finance laws is the biannual publication, Campaign Finance
Laws.  States vary greatly in whether they have legal limits on campaign contributions by
individuals, PACs, corporations, unions, and parties (Stratmann and Aparicio-Castillo 2002).  In
this study I focus on individual limits, as they provide the largest source contributions to state
candidates (Malbin and Gais, 1998).
13   Another reason not to examine union or corporate
contribution limits is that in some states union and corporate contributions are prohibited, and
therefore prohibitions allow one to examine the effects of banning contributions, but not to study
the effect of limiting but still allowing contributions, as is the goal of this paper.
14
This data set includes thirty-seven of the fifty states.  Since the empirical analysis focuses
on single member districts, Arizona, New Jersey, and North Dakota are omitted from this data
set.  State legislators from these states run in multi-member districts.  Similarly, Maryland and
Vermont are excluded because their legislators run primarily in multi member districts. 
Nebraska is omitted because its elections are staggered.  Louisiana is omitted as its relevant
competition occurs in primaries, and sometimes there is no general election depending on the16
outcome of the primary.  No data or limited data were available for Alabama, Delaware, Iowa
and South Dakota.  Mississippi and Virginia are excluded because I focus on elections in 1996,
1998, and 2000 while the races in these states were in off election years.
V.  Results
Table 1A reports means and standard deviation of variables used in the regressions with
open seat candidates, and Table 1B does the same for regressions involving races with
incumbents.  As with previous work, I do not include races where there was only one uncontested
candidate.  The open seat elections analyzed in the regression involve races that have two major
party candidates, and the same holds for races with incumbents.  Tables 1A and 1B show that
approximately seventy percent of all races take place in states that have individual contribution
limits.  Democrats win open seat races with approximately fifty percent of the vote (Table 1A),
while incumbents win contested races by obtaining on average sixty-six percent of the vote share
(Table 1B).  This shows that open seat races are more competitive than races with contested
incumbents.  Campaign spending by open seat candidates is roughly equal at $80,000.  Spending
in races with incumbents is uneven.  Incumbents spent on average $87,900 in a race while their
challengers spent $22,300.
Table 2 reports the results for open seat races when the dependent variable is the
Democrat’s vote share.  The first three columns show the results when one does not account for
the fact that the effectiveness of spending differs across races.  The columns differ in that the first
column uses linear spending to explain vote shares, the second column log spending, and the
third column uses the square root of spending.  The last three columns have the same three17
Table 1A
Summary Statistics for Open Seat Races
Mean (Standard Deviation)
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(Legislator salary per days in
session), in hundreds of dollars
2.762
(2.055)
Open primary=1, 0 otherwise 0.511
(0.500)
Percent of popular vote of
presidential candidate with the
same party affiliation as the




Percent of popular of
gubernatorial candidate with the
same party affiliation as the








Term limit=1, 0 otherwise 0.604
(0.496)
N 1,246
Notes: Campaign expenditures in real 2000 dollars. Measured in 10,000 of dollars. Data are for races
to state lower Houses, 1996-2000.18
Table 1B
Summary Statistics for Races with Incumbents
Mean (Standard Deviation)








Incumbent is Democrat=1, 0 ow. 0.515
(0.500)
Percent of popular vote in previous election 69.72
(16.67)




Professionalism in legislature (Legislator




Open primary=1, 0 otherwise 0.547
(0.498)
Percent of popular vote of presidential
candidate with the same party affiliation as the
incumbent - if presidential election
47.11
(8.169)
Percent of popular of gubernatorial candidate
with the same party affiliation as the
incumbent - if gubernatorial election
45.42
(14.71)
State per capita income, in thousands of dollars 16.063
(2.288)
Term limit=1, 0 otherwise 0.438
(0.496)





Notes: Campaign expenditures measured in 10,000 of dollars in real 2000 dollars. Data are for races
to state lower Houses, 1996-2000.19
Table 2
Explaining Vote Shares of Open Seat Candidates
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 $1 0.001 0.001 0.001
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Open primary=1, 0 0.423 0.010 0.620 0.550 0.014 0.73920


























































cycles YES YES YES YES YES YES
R-squared  0.46  0.59  0.53  0.48 0.60  0.56
Notes: N=1,266.  The dependent variable is the Democrat’s vote share in a race to a state lower
House in the 1996, 1998, and 2000 general elections.  Expenditures are measured in 100,000 of (real
2000) dollars.   
alternative specifications, but allow for the effectiveness of spending to differ,  depending on
whether candidates face contribution limits or not.  Whenever the regression includes log
spending, the dependent variable is the log of the vote share (Table 2, columns 2 and 5) instead
of the vote share itself.   As shown in equation (3), this specification implies estimating the effect
of relative spending on vote shares. In the other specifications the dependent variable is the
untransformed vote share.
The first three columns of Table 2 indicate that the marginal product of spending is larger
Republicans than for Democrats.  A $10,000 increase in spending increases the popular vote by21
0.18 percentage points for Democrats and by 0.26 percentage points for Republicans, and this
difference in the marginal product of spending is statistically significant at the five percent level
(Table 2, column 1).  When estimating the regression with the square root of spending, campaign
spending remains productive for both Democrats and Republicans and the difference in the
productivity of spending between Republicans and Democrats remains statistically significant 
(Table 2, column 3).  When evaluated at the mean spending levels, the point estimates associated
with the square root of spending imply that a $10,000 increase in spending increases
Republicans’ percent at the polls by 0.7 percentage points and Democrats’ percent by 0.5
percentage pints. However, the log-log specification shows that the elasticity of spending is equal
for both party members. Here, a one percent increase in spending results in a 0.13 percentage
increase in the popular vote. Evaluated at the mean, a one percent increase in spending equals
almost $800, and a percentage change by 0.12 percent implies an increase of 0.065 percentage
points in the popular vote.  Thus, open seat candidates must spent about $12,000 to increase their
vote share by one percent.
While the regression explains forty-six percent of the variation when linear spending is
employed, the R-square increases to fifty percent in the square root specification and to fifty-one
percent in the log-log specification.  The fact that regression produces a better fit in the non-
linear specifications suggests that campaign spending is subject to diminishing marginal returns. 
For consistency, the regression with open seat races uses all of the control variables that
will be used in the regression with incumbents.   Among the control variables, the vote share of
the Democratic candidate in the previous vote share has the anticipated positive sign and is
statistically significant. Among the remaining control variables, only the vote share of the15That some of the covariates are not statistically significant is perhaps not surprising
because these variables were hypothesized to be important in determining incumbents’ vote
shares, not vote shares of open seat candidates.   However, I included these covariates in the open
seat regressions to allow for comparability between open seat regressions and regressions with
incumbents.
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democratic presidential candidate and state per capita income have consistently the same sign
regardless of specification and are statistically significant.
15  Those results show the existence of
coattail effects and that Democrats in open seat races do better in elections when state per capita
income is high.  Vote shares in open seat races are not affected by term limits, the gubernatorial
vote share, whether the primary is open, whether the state has contribution limits, and by the
professionalism of the legislature.   The point estimates on the campaign expenditure variable are
robust to alterative specifications.  For example, the coefficients on the campaign expenditures
by Democrats and Republicans do not change by much, either quantitatively or qualitatively,
when we exclude the state control variables. 
The last three columns of Table 2 tests the hypothesis that campaign spending is more
productive in increasing votes in states with contributions limits.  For states without contribution
limits, the effectiveness of linear spending is estimated as 0.13 percentage points per $10,000
campaign expenditure for Democrats and as 0.20 percentage points for Republicans.  Limits
increase the productivity of spending to 0.6 percent for Democrats and 0.7 percent for
Republicans.  Thus, spending is over three times as productive in states with contribution limits
than in states without these limits, and this difference in the productivity is statistically
significant for both Democrats and Republicans.  Using log-log specification, the elasticity point
estimate indicates that a one percent increase in campaign expenditures increases the vote shares
by approximately 0.11 percent in states without limits and approximately 0.16 in states with16When adding state fixed effects to the regression in Table 2, many of the standard errors
approximately double in size.  However, the point estimates remain statistically significant, and
their magnitudes are similar to the magnitudes of the coefficients wen no fixed effects are added
to the regression.  Thus the inclusion of state fixed effects leaves the conclusions unaltered.
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contribution limits.   Relative to the linear specification, we find qualitatively similar but
quantitatively larger effects when we run the regression using the square root transformation of
campaign contributions.  In the square root specification candidates in limit-states receive
between 0.9 and 1.0 extra percentage points for an additional increase of $10,000 in spending,
when evaluated at the mean spending level.   The first three columns of table A2 in the appendix
report open seat regression results when nine regional indicators are added to the regression
equation.  The point estimates and t-statistics are similar to those reported in Table 2.
16
The results from the open seat regressions lend support to the hypothesis that voters are
less likely to respond to advertising when contribution limits curtail the amount of money a
candidate can seek from contributors.  The productivity of contributions is significantly higher in
states with limits than in states without limits.  Next, I will examine the effect of campaign
spending in races with incumbents.
The OLS results in the first three columns of Table 3 show that the coefficients on
incumbent and challenger spending are quantitatively and qualitatively similar to those in
previous literature: the effect of incumbent spending is negative and not different from zero, and
challenger spending is productive in reducing the incumbents’ vote shares.  For challengers a
10,000 increase in spending increases vote shares by 0.4 percentage points (Table 4, column 1). 
The log-spending and the square root of spending specifications also show that incumbent
spending is ineffective in increasing incumbents’ vote shares but that challenger spending is 24
Table 3 
Explaining Vote Shares Incumbents
Ordinary Least Square Estimates





























































p-value that $2  $1 0.051 0.001 0.001
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cycles YES YES YES YES YES YES
R-squared  0.36  0.49  0.40  0.39 0.49  0.38
Notes: N=3,962.  All standard errors are adjusted to allow for non-independence of observations
within a state. The unit of observation is a race to a state lower House in the 1996, 1998, and 2000
general elections.  Expenditures are measured in 10,000 of (real 2000) dollars. 
effective to increase challengers’ vote shares.  For example, the square root specification
indicates that a challenger’s vote share rises by 1.6 percentage points when he or she spends an
extra $10,000.
Comparing the state-level OLS results for incumbent and challenger spending (Table 3,
columns 1 to 3) with the federal-level OLS results in previous studies, one notices that the
federal studies report somewhat similar effects of incumbent and challenger campaign
expenditures on vote shares.  For example, Jacobson (1980) reports that $100,000 in spending
increases challengers vote share by 2.7 percentage points using OLS estimation, while incumbent26
expenditures are ineffective in increasing incumbents’ vote shares.  Green and Krasno’s (1988)
OLS results imply that $100,000 spending translates into a 0.1 percent vote share increase for
incumbents and 1.6 percentage point increase for challengers.  The first three columns of Table 3
show that spending by incumbents of state Houses is as unproductive as incumbents’ spending at the
federal level, while spending by state challengers is somewhat more productive (a 0.4 percentage
point increase for an extra $10,000 increase in spending, Table 3, column 1) than spending by U.S.
House of Representative challengers (a 1.6 to 2.7 percentage point increase for a $100,000
increase in spending).
Among the control variables in Table 3, the vote share in the previous elections is
statistically significant in all regressions, suggesting that partisan leanings are important in
explaining election outcomes.  All specifications indicate that Democrat incumbents, on average,
receive about two percentage points more at the polls than Republican incumbents. The
hypothesis that a more professional legislature helps incumbents receive a larger vote share finds
support in all specifications.  Further, lower incumbents’ vote shares are associated with
campaign contribution limits.  However, term limits have no statistically significant effect on
incumbents’ vote shares.  The coefficients on state per capita income are always positive and
statistically significant, indicating that incumbents are doing better at the polls when voters are
doing well in terms of per capita income.  Whether incumbents run for reelection in states with or
without open primaries does not affect their vote shares.  Finally, the results show that coattail
effects exist with respect to votes cast in presidential races, but not with respect to votes cast in
gubernatorial races.  An increase in the presidential candidate’s popular vote by one percentage
point results in a 0.2 percentage point increase in the incumbent’s vote share when he or she27
belongs to the same party as the presidential candidate. 
The last three columns of Table 3 show the OLS estimation results when one allows for the
productivity of incumbent and challenger spending to differ according to whether contribution limits
curtail their fundraising ability or not.  In all three specifications, incumbent spending is
ineffective in increasing their vote shares when they run for reelection in states without
contribution limits; the coefficients are negative and statistically insignificant.  However, in all
specifications incumbent spending is productive in helping them get reelected when they run in
states with contribution limits.  The difference in the productivity of incumbent spending in
states with and without limits is statistically significant in all three specifications.  The result
from the linear specification shows that a $10,000 increase in incumbent spending leads to an
almost 0.1 percentage point increase in the popular vote, while the square root specifications
indicates an increase by 0.17 percentage points, when evaluated at the mean incumbent spending.
Challenger spending remains more productive than incumbent spending (Table 3,
columns 4 to 6). Similar as incumbent spending, challenger spending is more productive in states
with contribution limits.  The difference in the productivity of spending is statistically significant
regardless of whether the contribution variable is measured in linear form, as the log, or as the
square root. While the magnitude of the point estimates on incumbent spending in states with
contribution limits remains small, the result for challenger spending in states with limits implies
that a $10,000 increase in spending increases vote shares between 1.2 percentage points (Table 3,
column 4) and 2.5 percentage points (Table 3, column 6).  The log-log specification results show
that a one percent increase in challenger spending in contribution limit states increases their vote
shares by 0.13 percent.  Challengers’ vote shares increase by 0.09 percent in states without28
contribution limits. 
Consistent with the theoretical models, incumbent contributions and challenger
contributions are more effective in increasing vote shares when they face contribution limits. 
Similar as some of the previous literature, these regression results suggest that the marginal effect
of incumbent spending is significantly lower than that of the challenger.  To further investigate
this issue I estimate the regression in Table 3 with 2SLS.  
Table 4 reports the 2SLS estimates, controlling for the endogeneity of incumbent
campaign spending.  The corresponding first stage estimates show that advertising costs are a
statistically significant determinant of campaign spending.  A one-thousand dollar rise in the cost
per rating point increases incumbent spending by eighteen percent (Table A1).  Thus, the
instrument is valid with respect to being able to explain variation in the endogenous incumbent
campaign spending variable.
The first three columns of Table 4 show the 2SLS estimates when no distinction is made
between candidates running in states with and without contribution limits.  Incumbent spending
has now a positive sign in all three specifications and the productivity of spending increases more
than ten fold relative to the corresponding regressions in Table 3, however the point estimates
remain statistically insignificant.  Challenger spending remains statistically significant and the
magnitudes of the 2SLS point estimates increase by approximately fifty percent.  The regressions
show that the advertising instrument works in the way that was anticipated: OLS underestimates
the effect of incumbent campaign spending.  A Republican incumbent running for reelection in a
district with unobserved preferences for a Republican representative, for example, will receive a
high vote share even if he or she has few campaign expenditures.  This unobserved and thus29
Table 4
Explaining Vote Shares Incumbents
Two Stage Least Squares Estimates
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Table 3?
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Indicators for election
cycles
YES  YES  YES  YES YES  YES
Notes: N=3,962.  All standard errors are adjusted to allow for non-independence of observations
within a state. The unit of observation is a race to a state lower House in the 1996, 1998, and 2000
general elections.  Expenditures are measured in 10,000 of (real 2000) dollars. 30
omitted variable causes downward bias on the coefficient associated with incumbent spending.
The results in Table 4 are consistent with the hypothesis that OLS introduces a downward bias in
incumbent spending productivity.
The first three columns of table 4 show that incumbent spending remains less productive
than challenger spending.  A simple comparison of the point estimates indicates that challenger
spending is approximately twice as productive as incumbent spending.  Next, I will examine
whether this difference in productivity disappears when allowing for the effectiveness of
spending to differ by whether candidates run in states with or without contribution limits.
The last three columns of table 4 report the 2SLS results when one allows the
productivity of spending to differ depending on whether candidates run in states with or without
contribution limits.  The results now show that spending is productive for incumbents in both
types of states, although incumbents’ productivity of spending is significantly higher when they
run in states that limit contributions.  A $10,000 increase in spending increases incumbents’ vote
share by 0.2 percentage points in states with limits and by 3.4  percentage points in states without
limits (Table 4, column 4).  The corresponding percentage point changes for the square root
specification are 0.4 and 2.5 percentage points.  In all specifications the difference in spending
productivity between both incumbent types is statistically significant.  
As in Table 3, the results show that challenger spending is more productive in states with
limits than without limits.  Relative to the OLS estimates, Table 4, columns 4 to 5 show that all
point estimates are larger when estimating the regression equation with 2SLS.  In the linear
specification the estimates show that challenger spending is almost ten times more productive in
garnering votes in states with limits than in states without limits, while the square root17Related to this finding is the study by Gerber (1998) who found that challenger and
incumbent spending in U.S. Senate races is equally productive.
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specification indicates that spending is three times more productive in states with limits.
The magnitudes of the 2SLS coefficients in the log-log specification also increased
relative to the OLS estimates.  The results show that the increasing expenditures by one percent
leads to a 0.17 percent increase in the vote share for incumbents and a 0.19 percent increase for
challengers when they run in states without contribution limits.
The 2SLS results show that challenger spending is approximately as productive as
incumbent spending when both candidates run in states with contribution limits.  The coefficients
on spending by both candidates are not statistically different from each other, and thus we can not
reject the hypothesis that their spending productivity is equal in absolute value.
17  Interestingly, in
states without  contribution limits challenger spending is almost twice as productive as
incumbent spending, and this difference is statistically significant in all three specifications
(Table 4, column 4 to 6).  
For comparison, Jabcobson’s (1980) 2SLS results show that challengers’ vote shares
increase by 4.2 percentage points using 2SLS, while incumbent expenditures are ineffective in
altering vote shares.  Green and Krasno’s (1988) 2SLS estimates imply that $100,000 spending
translates into a 2.4 percent vote share increase for incumbents and a 2.2 percentage point
increase for challengers.  The estimates for contribution limit states reported in this study are
larger than the previously reported estimates, up to one order of magnitude.  For example, Table
4, column 4 indicates that a $10,000 increase in incumbent spending increases their vote shares
by 3.4 percentage points, and that a corresponding increase in challenger spending results in a 3.932
percent increase.  However, when candidates run in states without contribution limits, a $10,000
increase in spending results in a 0.2 percent increase in vote shares for incumbents and a 0.4
percent increase for challengers, which is similar to the findings in the previously mentioned
studies at the federal level.
VI.  Conclusions
This paper shows that campaign advertising is more productive when contributions are
limited, as opposed to unlimited.   In races that are subject to contribution limits, an extra
$10,000 in challenger spending increases his or her vote share by up to 4 percent, and the same
increase in incumbent spending raises the incumbent’s vote share by 3.4 percent.  However, in
races not subject to contribution limits, the same increase in spending raises challengers’ vote
shares by 0.4 percent and incumbents’ vote shares by 0.2 percent.  While incumbents’ and
challengers’ campaign spending is equally productive when they run in states that limit
contributions, challengers’ spending is more productive than incumbents’ spending when they
run in states without contribution limits.  In open seat races that are subject to contribution limits,
a $10,000 spending increase raises vote shares by up to 1 percentage point, while the same
increase in spending raises their votes shares only between 0.4 and 0.5 percentage points when
the candidates are not subject to contribution limits.  These results demonstrate that campaign
advertising is more productive when contributions are limited, as opposed to unlimited.   
That the results in this paper show that campaign spending is productive helps resolve the
long standing question of why candidates spend money on advertising when it appears that this is
not effective in garnering votes.  These results suggest that previous work found low productivity33
of campaign spending because its research design did not allow for productivity of spending to
differ across campaign finance regulations.  
The results are consistent with the theoretical models that voters are less responsive to
campaign advertisements when contributions are unlimited because they believe that candidates
who run in states where contributions are unlimited have promised many favors to contributors.
Thus the findings are consistent with the hypothesis that contribution limits reduce the perception
of corruption. The regression results document a smaller marginal impact of political advertising
when campaign contributions are unlimited than when contributions are limited, which suggests
that voters believe that more policy favors are promised when contributions are unlimited. 
However, the nature of the data employed does not allow one to obtain direct evidence that
candidates trade contributions for policy favors.
The marginal product of incumbent and challenger spending is equal in states with
contribution limits and in these states campaign spending is an effective means of increasing vote
shares.  Productivity of spending is significantly smaller in states with contribution limits for
both incumbents and challengers.  Interestingly, we find that even at this lower level of
productivity in states without contribution limits incumbent spending is less effective in
increasing vote shares than challenger spending. 34
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cycles YES YES YES
R-squared      0.15 0.49 0.40
Notes: N=3,962.  The dependent variable is the incumbent expenditure in a race to a state lower House in the 1996,
1998, and 2000 general elections.  Expenditures are measured in 10,000 of (real 2000) dollars. Table A2
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